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Do better informed people vote more? Recent theories of voter turnout emphasize
ap o s i t i v ee ﬀect of being informed on the propensity to vote, but the possibility of
endogenous information acquisition makes estimation of causal eﬀects diﬃcult. I es-
timate the causal eﬀects of being informed on voter turnout using unique data from a
natural experiment Copenhagen referendum on decentralization. Four of ﬁfteen dis-
tricts carried out a pilot project, exogenously making pilot city district voters more
informed about the eﬀects of decentralization. Empirical estimates based on survey
data conﬁrm a sizeable and statistically signiﬁcant causal eﬀect of being informed on
the propensity to vote.
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Ad e ﬁning feature of advanced democracies is universal suﬀrage: Everyone has the right
to vote. However, not everyone exercises this right and voter turnout varies considerably,
both over time and across countries and individuals. This variation is not random; across
individuals, it is a stylized fact of the empirical voter turnout literature that better edu-
cated individuals participate more frequently in elections, as do those with greater wealth
and higher incomes (Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone 1980). Unequal participation, whether in
general elections or in direct democracy settings, has important implications: First and
foremost, political participation is an instrument of representation and, therefore, unequal
participation can distort the pattern of representation necessary for democratic respon-
siveness, leading to real eﬀects on policy outcomes.1 In an encompassing survey of voter
turnout across countries and over time, Lijphart (1997, 1) concludes that “unequal partic-
ipation spells unequal inﬂuence,” and this stylized fact forms the basis of recent political
economy models such as Benabou (2000). Second, participatory inequality is a problem
if democratic participation is seen as an intrinsic good (Pateman, 1970) in addition to
its role as a representational instrument, and it may create doubts about the democratic
legitimacy of a given political setting.
Eﬀorts to understand the determinants of voter turnout often take observed empirical
regularities as their starting point. The key ﬁnding of Wolﬁnger and Rosenstone (1980) that
education is the most important predictor of voting forms the basis of recent innovative
work by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999) arguing that informational diﬀerences
among voters can help explain the observed variation in political participation. In their
models of single issue elections, uninformed citizens’ optimal choice can be to abstain from
voting, even if they prefer one alternative to the other (the swing voter’s curse). Instead,
they eﬀectively delegate decision-making powers to informed voters, thereby increasing the
likelihood of the optimal policy being chosen. Matsusaka (1995) and Ghirardato and Katz
1(2002) also consider the eﬀects of being informed on the propensity to vote, but their
explanation relies on subjective uncertainty about the quality of information and, hence,
the risk of making the wrong decision, rather than through the strategic reasoning applied
in Feddersen and Pesendorfer.
In these models there is a causal eﬀect from being, or feeling, informed on the propensity
to vote. However, almost all empirical evidence, whether based on educational attainment
or other measures of information and informedness, really reports correlations rather than
causal eﬀects, although the analysis is often embedded in a regression framework. The
problem is that information acquisition is endogenous and, therefore, that both the decision
to vote and the decision to obtain an education or become informed about political issues
can be caused by some third, unobservable, factor. Hence, to make a statement about
causal eﬀects in order to empirically evaluate the theoretical work, it is necessary to address
the endogeneity problem.
In this paper I use unique data from a natural experiment to correct for possible endo-
geneity of being informed. Natural, or quasi, experiments have long been a part of program
evaluation in psychology (Campbell 1969; Cook and Campbell 1979) and labor economics
(Meyer 1995; Angrist and Krueger 2001). The key feature of natural experiments is to sup-
ply an exogenous source of variation in explanatory variables that determine the treatment
assignment in a non-experimental setting.2 O n et y p eo fn a t u r a le x p e r i m e n t si n v o l v epilot
projects (Campbell 1969, 426) where a subset of administrative units are involved in a trial
program that can, eventually, be spread to other units. I use a pilot-project experiment
on decentralization in Copenhagen, and a subsequent referendum determining whether full
reform should be implemented, to estimate the causal eﬀects of being (more) informed on
voting propensity. The pilot project structure of the social experiment means that citizens
of the treated city districts will have ﬁrst-hand experience of the eﬀects of decentralization
in contrast to the control group of citizens, residing in the other city districts. As I show
2below, this exogenously determined variation in experience translates into diﬀerences in
the degree of information across districts, making it possible to estimate directly the eﬀect
of being informed on voter turnout in a city-wide referendum using survey data.3
Endogeneity of information acquisition cannot be rejected and I show that being in-
formed does cause a greater propensity to vote. This eﬀect is quantitatively important
and larger than the eﬀect estimated by conventional methods. The eﬀect is stable over
diﬀerent conﬁgurations of instruments and diﬀerent samples, it is stronger for people with
no cost of voting, and appears to be driven primarily by increasing the propensity to vote
for people who do not ordinarily vote in local elections. Furthermore, I ﬁnd evidence of an
indirect eﬀect of education through increased levels of information.
The paper proceeds as follows: After a brief look at related literature, the next section
reviews theoretical work linking knowledge and turnout, while sections three and four
describe the natural experiment setting and the data, respectively. Section ﬁve presents
the empirical analysis and section six concludes.
Related literature The literature on voter turnout is voluminous, and no attempt to
survey it will be made here; recent surveys and discussions of the literature are provided
in Blais (2000) and Schlozman (2002). Matsusaka and Palda (1999) review some empirical
evidence, and Besley and Case (2003) discuss in detail the institutional determinants of the
mapping from voting to policy outcomes. Two recent papers investigate the causal eﬀect
of education on voter turnout: Following a literature in labor economics, Dee (2003) and
Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos (2003) use U.S. state government variation in compulsory
schooling laws as instruments to identify the eﬀect of education on voter turnout and other
aspects of civic participation. Both studies ﬁnd that more education causes a higher
propensity to vote. Milligan et al. further ﬁnd that education also implies greater political
knowledge and greater interest in politics. However, this does not imply a causal eﬀect of
3more knowledge on the propensity to vote and, thus, leaves open the question of exactly
how education increases turnout; several reasons are possible, including lowering costs of
information processing but also through reducing alienation and increasing compliance
with social norms through socialization.
A key result of Milligan et al. is that the eﬀect of education on turnout in the United
States disappears when conditioning on registered voters, suggesting that the role of ed-
ucation is to overcome registration barriers, and that there is no eﬀect of education on
turnout in the United Kingdom, where registration to a large extent is carried out by local
governments; see, though, Matsusaka and Palda for evidence of the eﬀects of education on
Canadian data. In Denmark, everyone is automatically registered as voters, resembling the
British rather than the American system and, as I show below, I too ﬁnd no direct eﬀect
of education on voter turnout, but there is some evidence of an indirect eﬀect, through
information.
Where appropriate natural experiments can be diﬃcult to identify, ﬁeld experiments are
possible alternatives. Gerber and Green (2000) conduct a ﬁeld experiment to investigate
the eﬀects of contacting voters to remind them of an upcoming election. The purpose
of the contact is to inform voters about the fact that an election is taking place, rather
than about the issues of the election and the candidates themselves. Such a reminder is
automatically issued in Denmark, as everyone eligible to vote receives a ‘ballot card’ to be
presented at the polling station.
In an analysis of the eﬀects of information on New Deal spending in the United States,
Str¨ omberg (2001) ﬁnds that regions that were more informed, measured by a higher share
of radio ownership, had higher turnout. However, it is not possible to distinguish whether
radio owners were more informed about the fact that there was a general election, whether
it increased general political interest or whether it was exact information about the election
issues that caused higher turnout. In any case, Str¨ omberg’s interesting analysis concerns
4general elections and, as such, is not directly linked to the theoretical work described below.
One paper to address issues similar to those considered here is a recent paper by Larci-
nese (2002). He considers the relation between political information and voter turnout in
a British General Election using an instrumental variables approach. However, it seems
that his key instrument, readership of quality newspapers, could be related to unobserved
heterogeneity (e.g. values) and, thus, is determined jointly with political information and
voter turnout.
2W h y b e i n g i n f o r m e d a ﬀects voting behavior
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999) propose a game-theoretic model of voting, where
the turnout decision is inﬂuenced by the information structure facing prospective voters.
The election they consider is a referendum on whether to adopt a new policy (the alter-
native) instead of the status quo. In the model, voting is costless for all agents and, thus,
abstention cannot be explained by diﬀerences in the cost of voting, in contrast to the tra-
ditional decision-theoretic literature originating with Riker and Ordeshook (1968). The
diﬀerence in the voting behavior among agents comes from the presence of asymmetric in-
formation. All agents receive a signal, indicating the probability of one state of the world.
Some agents receive a signal revealing the state of the world with probability one; these are
referred to as informed. The remaining agents receive no information about the realized
state beyond the common knowledge prior; these agents are referred to as uninformed.
The central result of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) is that it can be optimal for
uninformed independent voters to abstain from voting even though they may prefer one
alternative to the other. The reason is that by abstaining they eﬀectively defer the choice
to the informed voters who, by deﬁnition, vote for the correct policy; when there is a
large number of voters, this will lead to the correct policy being chosen (Feddersen and
5Pesendorfer 1997). The central empirical prediction is that (more) informed agents should
vote in the election, while uninformed agents should abstain from voting. At the aggregate
level, increasing the expected fraction of informed voters will, then, lead to a lower level of
abstention.
Recent decision-theoretic models yield a similar hypothesis. This approach considers
a single voter and how being informed aﬀects her decision to vote or abstain. Matsusaka
(1995) models this by parameterizing the voter’s certainty that she votes for the right
candidate, that is, the candidate that, if elected, yields the highest total utility to the voter.
As stressed by Matsusaka, and also a feature of the other models reviewed in this section,
it is the voter’s subjective belief about her information level that guides participation, and
this can diﬀer from “objective” measures of political knowledge. The key result is that
voters who feel more conﬁdent about their choice derives a higher utility from voting. In
a similar spirit, Ghirardato and Katz (2002) models the choice of ambiguity-averse voters
who diﬀer in their quality of information. Their careful modelling approach yields the key
result that it will be optimal for an instrumentally rational voter to abstain from voting
when candidates (or policy choices) as ambiguous prospects are complementary in the sense
that diﬀerent policy options are preferred in diﬀerent states of the world.
In these models, voters are interested in the optimal policy being implemented. How-
ever, in actual referenda a number of issues can result in more ‘noisy’ voting than that
predicted by the model. First, the existence of a norm of voting, generally well-documented
in the empirical voting literature, can result in uninformed agents voting, regardless of the
fact that they — in the Feddersen and Pesendorfer world — would be better oﬀ (in ex-
pectations) by not voting. Second, uncertainty about the issue could take the form of a
status quo bias, documented in a variety of settings, leading uncertain voters to vote for
the status quo where abstaining, according to the reasoning in the models, would be op-
timal. Third, the literature on protest voting, e.g. Horton and Thompson (1962), argues
6that local referendums may serve as institutional outlets for protests, leading to negative
voting, i.e. against new proposals. All three eﬀects will tend to increase turnout for a
given distribution of information; however, this is not a problem for the analysis below, as
it biases the data against conﬁrming the hypothesis.
3 A Natural Experiment on Decentralization
In 1996, the municipality of Copenhagen, Denmark, of almost half a million inhabitants,
introduced an experiment on decentralization of the city administration. For the purpose
of the experiment, the city was divided into ﬁfteen city districts, and four districts, chosen
such as to be representative of the city, introduced local administration for a four year
period. The actual selection of the four pilot city districts (PCD)w a sm a d eb yt h eC o p e n -
hagen Municipality Structural Commission in 1995 and, according to the chairman of the
committee (reported in Berlingske Tidende (1995), a Danish national newspaper), the se-
lection was made to achieve “a good balance of two inner city and two more suburban
neighborhoods, four distinct social proﬁles — one strong, one slightly above average, one
slightly below average, and one weak — and well as one large, two medium and one small
city district.”4
The local administration had been set up and a city district council elected for each
PCD in a local election, characterized by low turnout (PLS Consult 1999, 299), such that
the experiment could take eﬀect from January 1997. The degree of decentralization was
considerable, amounting to approximately 80 percent of municipality tasks (Klausen 2001),
including primary schools, day-care, care for the elderly, social assistance, and cultural and
recreational activities. The most important limitation to decentralization was that tax-
setting authority remained at the municipal level.
The decentralization experiment was evaluated in late 1999 by an external consulting
7ﬁrm (PLS Consult 1999) and on the basis of the evaluation report, the city council decided
to hold a consultatory referendum in the entire municipality of Copenhagen on whether
decentralization should be extended to all city districts or should be abolished completely
for all districts, including the PCDs.5 The City District Council (CDC) referendum was
held the same day, in September 2000, as a nationwide referendum on whether Denmark
should join the common European currency. Aggregate turnout in the city district refer-
endum was 70.5 percent, roughly equivalent to nationwide averages for local elections, and
considerably higher than in the local elections for the city district councils, but substan-
tially below the Copenhagen turnout in the nationwide referendum at 83.8 percent.6 The
outcome of the referendum was a substantial majority against decentralization: only in
one of the ﬁfteen districts — a PCD — was there a (narrow) majority for decentralization.
The regression analysis of referendum voting patterns in Klausen (2001) found that two of
four PCDs voted (weakly) signiﬁcantly more in favor of the reform. The outcome of the
referendum was that a decision was made by the city council to discontinue the experiment,
dismantling the pilot administrations from January 1, 2002.
The Copenhagen referendum on decentralization provides a unique natural experiment
for testing whether turnout is higher for more informed voters. First, it was a simple
referendum with a status quo and an alternative, and — importantly — the consequences
of the implemented policy would be the same, at least ex ante, for both treated and
non-treated districts such that PCD citizens would not gain or lose more than citizens
in the other districts. Second, a suitable exogenous instrument for being informed can be
identiﬁed. Third, the fact that the referendum was held in conjunction with the nationwide
referendum on Danish membership of the common European currency makes it possible
to focus on people with zero costs of voting, a key assumption of the theoretical studies
outlined above.
84D a t a
T h ed a t au s e di nt h em a i ne m p i r i c a la n a l y s i si s based on a telephone survey of Copenhagen
voters, carried out in November 2000. The survey, which was commissioned by the four
PCDs, was carried out as part of a project to analyze the voting patterns in the referendum
(Klausen 2001). Voters were partitioned into ﬁve strata, the four pilot city districts and
the rest of the city as a whole. No further subdivision was made, making the individual
voter the primary sampling unit. The (translated) question wording, variable coding and
descriptive statistics are given in the appendix. The response rate of the survey, calcu-
lated as the number of completed interviews relative to the sum of completions, refusals/no
answer and partial completions, was 55 percent, resulting in a main sample of 3021 ob-
servations. Within this sample, almost one-third did not wish to answer the question on
yearly income and a few did not want to disclose whether they voted in the referendum.
Therefore, the empirical analysis is based primarily on a sample of 2026 observations, but
the robustness of the results are demonstrated on the full data set, leaving out income as
an explanatory variable.
4.1 Measurement issues
To measure whether survey respondents themselves felt informed about the decentraliza-
tion issue, I use a question that asked respondents their opinion on the decentralization
experiment. If they responded that the experiment went well, medium well or bad, they
are coded as having an opinion and, thus, being informed. If they respond that they do not
have an opinion, they are coded as being uninformed. This way of measuring informedness
captures the subjective nature of being informed as stressed in the theoretical papers, in
contrast to index measures based on factual questions. Does people’s own perception of
their informedness bear any resemblance to more objective measures of being informed?
9Survey and opinion research in political science and psychology suggests this to be the case
(Krosnick 1999); for example, Faulkenberry and Mason (1978) ﬁnd that survey respondents
that answer “no opinion” or “don’t know” have signiﬁcantly lower factual knowledge of the
survey issues.7 Hence, the measure used in this paper serves both as a suitable measure of
subjective informedness and as a proxy for more objective information measures.
A standard problem of voter turnout studie sb a s e do ns u r v e y si st h a tt h ee s t i m a t e d
turnout from the survey is higher than the true turnout. This is also the case here: The
estimated turnout from the sample is 84.3 percent, 13.8 percentage points higher than the
true turnout registered at 70.5 percent (Copenhagen Statistical Oﬃce 2001). Two eﬀects
can be at work: First, those who choose not to participate in the survey often are the very
same people that did not vote (Brehm 1993). Second, people may report to have voted
even if they did not. While intentional misrepresentation of voters have long been thought
to be a major problem in surveys, recent public opinion research instead emphasizes the
problems of unrepresentative samples (Krosnick 1999; Burden 2000). Indeed, misreports
are often a result of memory failure, rather than intentional eﬀorts to misrepresent one’s
voting behavior (Belli et al. 1999).
The ﬁrst eﬀect above means that some people with certain characteristics are over-
and undersampled, respectively, and this can be addressed by probability sampling (post-
stratiﬁcation). The sample is unevenly allocated over the PCDs and the non-PCDs, due
to the survey design; this means that non-PCD citizens are severely underrepresented.
However, the sample is also biased, as is typically the case, towards people with higher
incomes and longer education.
By far the strongest imbalance, however, comes from the fact that people who partic-
ipate in the political process on a regular basis, captured by a question on whether they
voted in the previous municipal election, are strongly overrepresented in the sample. The
estimated turnout for the municipal election (held in 1997) based on this sample is 80.0
10percent, whereas the true turnout was only 58.0 percent, a noteworthy diﬀerence of 22.0
percentage points. Therefore, I reweight the sample by adjusting for past voting behavior
in municipal elections by city district when comparing variable means below, but the exact
reweighting procedure has no eﬀect on the regression analyses below, as these are done
on the unweighted sample; I return to the estimation procedure below. This reweighting
results in an estimated turnout for the CDC referendum of 73.9 percent, now only 3.4
percentage points higher than the true turnout and comfortably including the true turnout
in its 95 percent conﬁdence interval.8 Whether the remaining diﬀerence is due to other so-
cioeconomic factors underlying non-participation in the survey, or to misreporting cannot
be determined as present, as no voter validation data — comparing survey responses with
actual voting records — exist for Danish elections.9
5T h e E ﬀect of Information on Voting: Empirical Es-
timates
The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, after brieﬂy reviewing some estimation
issues when using complex survey data, I compare the pilot city districts with the control
districts to make sure that these are in fact comparable. Then I proceed to estimate the
eﬀect of exogenous exposure to information on the propensity to vote.
5.1 Analysis of stratiﬁed survey data
The literature on estimation under complex survey sampling consists of two approaches:
Model-based analysis, using unweighted data for estimation, and design-based analysis,
where features of the complex survey sampling such as diﬀe r i n gs a m p l i n gp r o babilities and
stratiﬁcation are taken into account (Levy and Lemeshow 1999).10 Deaton (1997) presents
the two approaches to regression analysis using data from complex surveys and shows that
11estimating descriptive statistics such as means and variances in a consistent way requires
design-based analyses, while matters are less clear cut in the case of regression analysis.
A general result of the literature (Wooldridge 2002) is that unweighted estimators are
consistent and more eﬃcient when stratiﬁcation is exogenous, as is the case here, where
stratiﬁcation is based on geographical units which are homogenous in observables (see
below) and individuals’ selection of district residency arguably is unrelated to the city
district experiment.
Therefore, I use weights when tabulating and comparing means, while I use unweighted
estimators in the regression analysis, but in fact regression results such as marginal eﬀects
and average treatment eﬀects are remarkably identical to those obtained using design-based
analysis, where sampling weights and within-stratum variation are accounted for.
5.2 Comparing pilot and control districts
Above, I described the selection of the four PCDs. These were selected so as to be repre-
sentative of the city’s composition such that the average treated citizen would be identical
to the average control citizen. This is important when evaluating the causality from in-
formation to voting. While individuals were sampled randomly within each stratum, if
the strata are diﬀerent, for example due to sorting, the treatment eﬀect on information
could be reﬂecting diﬀerences in other variables. Further, as discussed above, heterogene-
ity across strata would change stratiﬁcation from being exogenous to endogenous, which
would require a diﬀerent modelling approach (Wooldridge 2002).
Table 1 provides evidence that the districts are similar in observables. It reports
means for key variables based on the weighted sample, taking into account initial and
post-stratiﬁcation, for the treated and the control city districts, respectively. The means
reported are roughly the same across treated and non-treated districts, and are in only one
case weakly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Thus, the weighted sample means correctly reﬂect the
12fact the there are negligible diﬀerences in population means across the treated and non-
treated districts, substantiating the claim that the pilot city districts are representative of
the city as a whole.11 It is reassuring to see that diﬀerences in political attitudes are not
behind increased participation in the PCDs. For example, the reported level of political
interest is exactly the same in the two groups, implying that the eﬀect of exposure to the
decentralization experiment is not through an increased interest in local politics.12 The
estimates reported in the table also validate the claim made above that the share of citi-
zens using would-be decentralized services (service1 - service3) did not diﬀer substantially
across district types; the estimated district diﬀerence in the aggregate share of service users
is only a third of its standard error.
<Table 1 here >
The lower part of table 1 compares population diﬀerences based on administrative
data (from Copenhagen Statistical Oﬃce 2000a). While the categories generally are not
comparable to the survey responses in the top part of the table, it demonstrates that
population level diﬀerences are also of minor importance.
Are the few signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the treatment and the control group a cause
for concern when evaluating the eﬀect of being informed on voting? One possibility, used
extensively in the evaluation literature, is to use matching as a basis for comparison. Es-
sentially, matching tries to recover a random research design from observational data to
provide a basis for causal interpretation of the estimates. While individuals could not
self-select into treatment,13 matching ensures that assignment to the experiment, condi-
tional on observables, is random and independent of informedness and voting propensity
in the non-experiment state of the world. As shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), it
is under certain conditions suﬃcient to match on the propensity score, which is the prob-
ability of treatment conditional on observables, rather than on the vectors of observables
themselves.14 While propensity score matching under complex survey sampling seems not
13to have been addressed in the theoretical literature, I carried out nearest-neighbor match-
ing based on a propensity score estimated from a probit regression. This results in 82
observations, or 2.9 percent of the sample, being outside the common support. In this
reduced sample, all weighted sample mean diﬀerences are now insigniﬁcant. I report the
results of regression on this sample below.
5.3 Empirical model
I model the voting decision and the decision to become informed in a latent variable
framework. For voter i,l e tT∗






TxTi+ γINFi + εi,
where xTi is a covariate vector and INFi is a dummy variable indicating that i reported
having an opinion about the city district experiment. The net beneﬁtf r o mv o t i n gi s




i > 0) = 1(β
0
TxTi+ γINFi + εi ≥ 0) (1)
where 1(·) denotes the indicator function. If being informed about the city district ex-
periment was exogenous, the parameters of (1) could be estimated directly specifying a
distribution for ε. However, the decision to become informed is endogenous, and failing to
take this into account would result in biased estimates. Let INF∗
i be individual i’s net
beneﬁt from being informed. The reduced form behavioral model, described in diﬀerent





INFxINF,i + δDi + νi
14where xINF,i is a vector of possible covariates and Di is a treatment dummy variable equal
to one if i resided in a PCD. Again, we do not observe INF∗
i but rather a dummy variable
INFi which indicates whether i reports having an opinion or not. This is deﬁned by
INFi = 1(INF
∗
i > 0) = 1(β
0
INFxINF,i + αDi + νi ≥ 0). (2)
Ignoring endogeneity of INF, estimation of (1) proceeds by specifying a distribution for
the error term ε, typically a normal (probit) or a logistic (logit) distribution.15 An a t u r a l
extension of this assumption to include possible endogeneity of information acquisition is
to assume a bivariate probit model where εi and νi are jointly normally distributed with
E (εi)=E (νi)=0 ,v a r(εi)=var(νi)=1a n dcov (εi,ν i)=ρ. The model is identiﬁed if
living in a PCD aﬀects the propensity to vote only through its eﬀect on information (the
exclusion restriction). I return to this issue below.
Since INF is a binary variable, estimating the system (1) and (2) by linear methods
such as two-stage least squares will not give consistent results. However, as noted by An-
grist (1991), in certain cases the TSLS estimate can be close to the average treatment eﬀect
estimated by the bivariate probit model (see, though, also Angrist 2001). For comparison,
below I present results from OLS, TSLS as well as the IV-probit and the full bivariate
probit models.16
5.4 Main results
Before embarking on the multivariate analysis, I look at mean diﬀerences. The upper part
of table two reports the estimated population means of informed individuals in treated
and control city districts, and the lower part reports estimated population turnout rates
for informed and uninformed individuals.
<Table 2 here >
15The diﬀerence in the fraction of informed people in the two groups is almost 13 percent-
age points and strongly signiﬁcant. Similarly, the estimated diﬀerence in turnout between
informed and uninformed individuals is almost 10 percentage points, nearly signiﬁcant at
the 99 percent level. Of course, inference from simple two-ways tables can be misleading,
since it does not account for other potential inﬂuences as well as possible endogeneity. I
now turn to multivariate analysis, to control for other potential inﬂuences on the propensity
to vote.
Table 3 displays the results of three speciﬁcations of the full regression model based
on the survey data: Single equation probit, IV-probit (based on Newey 1987) and full
bivariate probit. The table reports estimated coeﬃcients, standard errors and marginal
eﬀects (calculated at the means of the other variables) for the variable of interest informed
and the full set of controls. The ﬁrst column reports results of the single equation probit
speciﬁcation (equivalent to estimating equation (1) directly, assuming ρ to be zero). The
estimated coeﬃcient for informed is, as expected, positive and it is estimated with consid-
erable precision. Columns two and three show results when correcting for the endogeneity
of informed using the pilot city district dummy (D = 1) as an instrument. The IV and
bivariate probit speciﬁcations increase the estimate of informed substantially: The coeﬃ-
cient in the bivariate probit model almost doubles and the marginal eﬀect is increased by a
factor 1.6. These estimates continue to be strongly signiﬁcant. The covariance coeﬃcient
ρ is estimated to be negative, but insigniﬁcant (see, though, below).17
<Table 3 here >
The estimated eﬀects of the control variables are also of interest: The propensity to
vote increases with income and is higher for women, users of municipal day care, those
with low education and regular voters.18 The other variables, mainly age, employment
and service user indicators, are insigniﬁcant. Note that these results are conditional on
past voting behavior and, thus, should be interpreted as eﬀects beyond those captured
16by a political participation “ﬁxed eﬀect.” If past voting is excluded as a control variable,
education becomes insigniﬁcant and age (squared) enters signiﬁcantly. These results are
generally stable, both quantitatively and in terms of signiﬁcance, across the speciﬁcations.
In particular, the bivariate probit speciﬁcation is almost identical to the single equation
probit except for the increase in the estimate of the endogenous variable. The estimated
eﬀect of being informed does not depend on set of covariates included; any subset of the
covariates can be dropped without altering the qualitative result on informed.
Using PCD treatment as an instrument for being informed for causal inference requires
it to be (i) a determinant of being informed and (ii) to be uncorrelated with the error term
(ε) of the main estimating equation (1). As noted above, table 2 shows it to satisfy the
ﬁrst requirement; a probit regression of informed on PCD yields a z-value of 5.39 for the
full sample.19 Hence, the validity of the results from the IV-probit and the bivariate probit
speciﬁcations depend on whether the second requirement is fulﬁlled. Problems could arise
if (a) (unobserved) diﬀerences in political interest and activism made some districts self-
select into the pilot program, (b) treatment assignment was not random (or unignorable)
or (c) the experiment itself increased PCD inhabitants’ interest in local politics or aﬀected
other variables that could inﬂuence voting behavior.20
Concern (a) cannot be valid as city districts did not exist as administrative entities
before the experiment and, furthermore, the exact partition of the city into districts was
made simultaneously with the choice of pilot districts.21 Concerns (b) and (c) can be
(partly) evaluated by looking at table 1. As noted above, there are no substantial diﬀerences
between treated and control city districts, as conﬁrmed by carrying out propensity score
matching. This conﬁrms the assumption of ignorable treatment assignment (b).
Regarding the exclusion restriction, (c), I could identify no other diﬀerences in attitudes
(and other variables) than that through information: for example are the levels of political
interest and the assessments of government responsiveness indistinguishable across treat-
17ment and control city districts, as are the more direct measures of political participation
such as voter turnout in the previous municipal election and in the Euro referendum; this
suggests that living in a pilot city district did not increase interest in local politics. It is
important to note that the notion of being informed is broader than it may seem at ﬁrst:
for example, if a PCD citizen had a bad experience with, say, decentralized elderly care
and because of this decided to vote (presumably no) in the election, then that is covered
by the present model. The experience, whether good or bad, serves to inform the treated
citizens about the consequences of decentralization, making it easier for them to form an
o p i n i o no nt h ed e c e n tralization issue.
While it is not possible to test directly the validity of the exclusion restriction, an
indirect approach could be to employ a test for overidentiﬁcation in the linear two-stage
least squares model. Evans and Schwab (1995) follow this approach in their bivariate
probit model of the eﬀect of catholic schooling on educational achievement, noting that
this may be the best available diagnostic. However, this calls for additional instruments. I
investigate two possibilities for increasing the number of instruments.
First, I utilize the fact that the experiment was implemented in four distinct districts
and include as instruments a dummy variable for each district rather than the PCD variable
used above. This allows for the possibility that the eﬀect of treatment on the degree of
informedness for treated individuals could diﬀer, perhaps owing to (unobserved) diﬀerences
in the local administration’s policies. Using individual PCDs as instruments yields a ﬁrst-
stage F-statistic of 9.4, indicating that the instruments are acceptable, and a J-statistic
of .523, p = .914; thus, the hypothesis of no overidentiﬁcation clearly cannot be rejected.
Second, I use the fact that users of decentralized services (elderly care, child care and
primary schools) are likely to know more about the eﬀects of decentralization than those
w h oj u s tl i v e di nt h eP C D s ,w h oi nt u r nk n o wm o r et h a nn o n - P C Dc i t i z e n s .A sIa r g u e d
in the introduction, a premise for the entire analysis is that citizens who lived in a PCD
18had more experience with the eﬀects of decentralization which, in turn, should constitute
itself through a higher level of informedness. Table 4 substantiates this claim by looking
at how direct experience with decentralized services translates into more information.
<Table 4 here>
Table 4 shows the estimated shares of informed citizens in PCDs and non-PCDs, re-
spectively, broken down by whether the respondent was a user of a decentralized service.
In PCDs, service users were signiﬁcantly more informed about the experiment and, impor-
tantly, this was not due to the fact that service users in general were better informed, as
there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the information levels between service users and non-
service users in non-PCDs. I put this to use in the regression analysis by interacting the
PCD dummy with the service user dummies to ﬁnd that treated individuals who were users
of day-care or primary schools reporting having an opinion more frequently than others in
the PCDs (not shown). I now have three instruments and this yields F (3,2010) = 8.35
and a p-value of the overidentiﬁcation test of .817. Together, both speciﬁcation with more
than one instrument suggest that the PCD indicator variable does not belong directly in
the estimating equation.22
To make sure that the results presented in table 3 are not artifacts of the sample or the
set of instruments chosen, in table 5 I compare the results across econometric speciﬁcations
including one and four instruments in two diﬀerent samples. The two top rows display
the coeﬃcient and standard error of informed for the same sample as table 3, using the
same set of covariates, using the single and four instruments, respectively, such that the
results for IV-probit and bivariate probit in the ﬁrst row are identical to those reported
in table 3. The two bottom rows consider a diﬀerent sample, where income has been left
out of the estimating equation to increase sample size and to make sure that leaving out
people who did not report income does not bias the results. Instead, as described above,
I have matched the treatment and control groups using nearest-neighbor propensity score
19matching. This results in 82 (control group) observations (2.9 percent) being outside the
common support.23
<Table 5 here >
The results reported in table 5 are broadly similar across speciﬁcations: In particular,
the choice of a single or four instruments seems to make little diﬀerence, whereas the esti-
mated eﬀects on the larger, matched sample are slightly smaller than the results based on
those who reported income.24 In total, the eﬀect of exogenous exposure to information on
voter participation is positive, strongly signiﬁcant and robust to alternative speciﬁcations.
The eﬀect of being informed, here deﬁned as the ability to formulate an opinion on the
referendum issue, is numerically large with average treatment eﬀects in the neighborhood
of twenty percentage points. Note that the treatment eﬀects are smaller and the covariance
coeﬃcient ρ signiﬁcantly negative in the lower part of the table, where the larger, matched
sample is employed; a likely reason for this is that individuals who did not want to report
yearly income may be less likely to have voted and, thus, the average treatment eﬀect is
overestimated when income nonrespondents are excluded.
I also explored possible determinants of being informed in addition to the exogenous
treatment indicators; the ﬁrst stage results of the TSLS estimation gave some indication
of variables that inﬂuenced whether respondents had an opinion on the decentralization
experiment. In results not reported, I ﬁnd that age enters strongly in an inverted U-shape;
this is consistent with the ﬁndings of Visser and Krosnick (1998) that attitude importance
is greater in middle adulthood. Furthermore, I ﬁnd education to be signiﬁcant: Those with
longer education are more likely to have formed an opinion, a standard result in opinion
research (Krosnick 1999; Faulkenberry and Mason 1978). Above, I noted that education
levels has no direct impact on the propensity to vote when past voting is not included,
echoing results from Milligan et al. (2003). However, the ﬁnding that education increases
the probability of being informed suggests that education may inﬂuence voting indirectly,
20possibly by lowering the costs of information processing. The estimated average treatment
eﬀects of being informed are slightly larger than those reported in table 4.
5.5 The cost of voting
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999) and Ghirardato and Katz (2002) motivate their
theories of informational voting by appealing to empirical evidence of roll-oﬀ,t h ef a c tt h a t
some voters facing multiple questions on a ballot do not cast a vote on every issue. Hence,
they envision a world where there are no costs to voting, in contrast to the costs tradition-
ally emphasized by economic theories of voting (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). One potential
cost is that associated with being aware of the election; however, as noted above, everyone
was provided the same stimulus to vote through a mailed ballot card to be presented at the
polling station. To ensure that other diﬀerences in voting costs are not the reason behind
the results on the eﬀect of information — even though it seems unlikely that there should
be diﬀerences in the costs of voting across city districts — in the following I exploit the
fact that the referendum was held on the day of the nationwide referendum on whether
Denmark should participate in the common European currency. Arguably an important
decision, turnout in the nationwide referendum was high, 87.6 percent at the national level
(Statistics Denmark, 2002) and, indeed, the rationale of holding the city referendum on
t h ed a yo ft h en a t i o n w i d er e f e r e n d u mw a se x p licitly to increase turnout. While the costs
of voting, for whatever reason, might diﬀer between those voting and those not voting in
t h en a t i o n w i d er e f e r e n d u m ,t h ec o s to fv o t i n g in the city referendum would be practically
zero for those already voting on the Euro. Furthermore, everyone eligible to vote in the
euro referendum was also eligible to vote in the city referendum, the former set of voters
being a strict subset of the latter.25 The results, not reported, are almost identical to those
reported above, with slightly larger ATEs.
As noted above, the existence of a social norm of voting for a given distribution of
21information will bias the data against ﬁnding any eﬀect of information on turnout. People
who are guided by such a social norm would be less aﬀected by information, as they
vote anyway. Hence, I would expect people who are regular voters to be less aﬀected
by information, while (exogenously) receiving information may induce those who do not
ordinarily vote to do so — that is, to increase T∗
i above zero in terms of the latent variable
model. If I exclude past voting as a control variable and instead split the sample (n = 2026)
into those who voted in the previous municipal election and those who did not, dropping
those who were not eligible to vote three years earlier, I ﬁnd that the eﬀect of information
is only borderline signiﬁcant for the municipal voter sample, whereas it is very strong and
signiﬁcant for those who reported not to have voted in the municipal election, even though
the sample in this case only has n = 293 (the instrument is somewhat weaker in this
sample). A similar pattern obtains for the larger, matched sample (n = 2788) where the
eﬀect is also signiﬁcant for those who voted in the municipal election but is much larger
for those who did not.
5.6 Why does ˆ γ increase under IV-estimation?
The results reported in table 3 show the estimate of ˆ γ, the coeﬃcient on informed in
the empirical model of voter turnout, to increase under instrumental variables estimation;
hence, the single equation approach underestimates the eﬀect of information on the propen-
sity to vote, which is also reﬂe c t e di nt h en e g a t i v eρ obtained from the bivariate probit
model. This is somewhat surprising, as one would expect the existence of unobserved het-
erogeneity with respect to voting and information acquisition to overstate the importance
of information. However, the results resonate with the ﬁndings of Dee (2003) and Milligan
et al. (2003), who estimate the causal eﬀect of education on turnout. These studies also
ﬁnd the estimates to increase under IV-estim a t i o n ,a sd oB r a d y ,V e r b aa n dS c h l o t z m a n
(1995) when instrumenting political interest.
22One likely reason for the result is the existence of measurement errors. Measurement
e r r o ri na ni n d e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l ei sk n o w nt o lead to attenuation bias in the estimate.
While measurement error is less likely to be a problem when considering education indica-
tors or demographic variables, as these are well-deﬁned, subjective assessments are much
more likely to be prone to such problems. It is a general ﬁnding of the survey literature
(Krosnick 1999) that respondents ﬁnd it much easier to answer questions on past actions,
such as whether one voted in a particular election, than to answer attitudinal question on
topics subjects may not have been giving much thought. This means that some degree
of randomness will enter into the answer of such questions, leading to measurement er-
ror. As the IV-approach, in addition to addressing the endogeneity problem, corrects for
measurement error, the estimate increases.
6 Concluding remarks
Theoretical work, with roots in observational empirical studies of voter behavior, has ar-
gued that being informed aﬀects the propensity to vote. Using a unique natural experiment
referendum, where a random fraction of the electorate was exogenously informed, the em-
pirical analysis presented in this paper suggests that information acquisition is endogenous
and demonstrates that there is a causal eﬀect of being informed on the propensity to vote
in a referendum setting. The estimated eﬀect is considerable: I ﬁnd that the average treat-
ment eﬀect of being informed on the propensity to vote is 20 percentage points, which is
more than the eﬀect estimated by conventional methods.26 The eﬀe c ti ss t a b l eo v e rd i ﬀer-
ent conﬁgurations of instruments and diﬀerent samples, it is stronger for people with no
cost of voting and appears to be driven primarily by increasing the propensity to vote for
people who do not ordinarily vote in local elections. The natural experiment used here does
not allow for distinguishing the decision-theoretic and game-theoretic approaches presented
23earlier; this may call for careful laboratory experiments, as the predictions of the various
models diﬀer in only subtle ways that can be diﬃcult to accommodate in even random
social experiments, but the results reported in this paper can serve as a necessary ﬁrst
step in motivating the importance of such experiments by conﬁrming the key hypothesis
on real-life data.
The empirical results also suggested an indirect eﬀect of education on turnout. As noted
in the introduction, Milligan et al. (2003) found, on U.S. data, that education does not
inﬂuence the propensity to vote when conditioning on registered voters, a ﬁnding corrobo-
rated by the insigniﬁcance of education on turnout in British elections, where most voters
are registered through local governments. In the Danish case considered here, where all
eligible voters are automatically registered, a similar result of no direct eﬀect of education
on turnout was obtained. However, the empirical ﬁndings show a strong eﬀect of education
on being informed and, since being informed was shown to aﬀect vote propensity causally,
this suggests that education, though indirectly, does contribute to a higher propensity to
vote. Combined, these ﬁndings suggest that education enters directly into the calculus of
voting by reducing expected utility costs associated with voter registration and information
acquisition, rather than through contextual or socialization eﬀects. Future research should
investigate the relative importance of these diﬀerent channels of inﬂuence in more detail
for both general elections and referenda in a causal framework.
24Notes
1One example that representation matters for outcomes is the ﬁnding by Ansolabehere,
Gerber and Snyder (2002) that court-ordered redistricting correcting disparities in the
populations of legislative districts in the United States has had a signiﬁcant impact on the
ﬂow of state transfers to counties.
2See, though, Campbell (1969) and Besley and Case (2000) for a discussion of caveats
in natural experiments, in particular when sources of policy diﬀerences across units are
due to legislation reﬂecting political sentiments of the electorate. Green and Gerber (2002)
provide an introduction to recent experimental work in political science.
3This formulation does not rule out the possibility that citizens residing in other dis-
tricts receive information about the consequences of the experiment through, say, city-wide
media, but assumes only that those living in treated city districts are more informed rel-
ative to some common level of information, due to direct experience with the eﬀects of
decentralization or possibly through local media. I return to this issue in section ﬁve.
4Author’s translation.
5The Danish constitution does not allow for binding referenda at the municipal level.
6Total number of votes cast in Copenhagen in the city and Euro referenda were, respec-
tively, 290,886 and 312,940, even though the set of eligible voters for the city referendum
was considerably larger (412,425) than in the Euro referendum (373,422). Source: Copen-
hagen Statistical Oﬃce (2001).
A brief note on Danish elections: Every Danish resident has an identiﬁcation number,
the CPR-number. Everyone eligible to vote in a particular election automatically receives
a ballot card sent to the address registered in the CPR-registry. The voter is required to
present the ballot card it the polling station, typically the nearest public school, which in
Copenhagen is rarely more than one kilometer away, and the fact that an individual has
voted is registered.
7Faulkenberry and Mason divide a sample of respondents on a survey on wind energy
25conversion issues into those with substantive opinions (favor, oppose), those with ambiva-
lent opinions (no opinion) and those with nonexistent opinions (don’t know). They ﬁnd
that those with substantive opinions have more factual knowledge (measured on an eight-
point scale) than those without such opinions, and, in turn, that those with ambivalent
opinions have more knowledge than those with nonexistent opinions.
8Post-stratiﬁcation on the matched sample (based on propensity score matching on the
full sample, see below) yields an estimated turnout of .723, even closer to the true turnout.
If survey respondents misreport past voting, is this a suitable variable on which to base
post-stratiﬁcation? First, the qualitative results are similar to those obtained by weighting
on education or income levels. Second, there is no impact on results, as long as the share
of those who misreport voting are similar across treated and untreated districts. Third,
if some voters misreport past voting behavior, reweighting will decrease their sampling
probability, resulting in a more balanced sample.
9Would using validated voting data change the conclusions? Krosnick (1999) provides
a critical review of survey problems related to voting behavior, noting that the use of
validated data does not change substantive conclusions. Presser et al. (1990) demonstrates
that administrative errors in vote registration is responsible for a large part of observed
voter misreports, leading them to question the validity of voter validation studies.
10A common feature of surveys is that data is collected in subunits (clusters) within
strata; however, this is not a feature of the present survey where the primary sampling
unit is individuals.
11This is further corrobated by the fact that accounting for stratiﬁcation when estimating
the model aﬀects the standard errors only at the ﬁfth decimal point.
12Citizens’ interest in politics before the experiment began (in 1996) was also similar
across would-be treatment and control districts (PLS Consult 1999, 204-5).
13Unless they actually moved with the explicit aim of living in a PCD, a situation which
26seems highly unlikely.
14Imai (2004) provides a very accessible introduction to propensity score matching in
the context of Gerber and Green’s (2000) random experiment.
15While the logit speciﬁcation is typically employed in the voter turnout literature, this
does not extend readily to the multivariate case. Single equation probit on the present
sample generally results in slightly lower t-statistics than in the logit case, making probit
estimation signiﬁcance levels conservative.
16If the errors are not jointly normal, the bivariate probit model is misspeciﬁed and can
lead to inconsistent estimates. However, simulation results of van der Klauuw and Koning
( 2 0 0 3 )s u g g e s tt h a tt h ee ﬀects of even serious misspeciﬁcation may be limited.
17A Rivers-Vuong test for exogeneity of a binary explanatory variable in a discrete re-
sponse model suggests that informed is endogenous (p =0 .034); see Wooldridge (2002, p.
478).
18More than 80 percent of children in the pre-school age are enrolled in day care (Copen-
hagen Statistical Oﬃce, 2001). Thus, this variable is a proxy for having small children
which, in turn, can be interpreted as a proxy for being married or cohabiting. I have no
information on marital status in the dataset, but being married tends to increase partici-
pation in most work on voter turnout.
19Ar u l eo ft h u m bi nt h eI V - e s t i m a t i o nl i t e r ature on weak instruments (Staiger and
Stock, 1997) suggests that ﬁrst-stage F-values of excluded instruments in two-stage least
s q u a r e se s t i m a t i o ns h o u l db el a r g e rt h a n1 0 .H e r e ,F (1,2012) = 20.03. While the TSLS
model obviously is incorrect in this binary framework, the large F-statistic nevertheless
suggests that PCD is a strong instrument.
20Angrist et al. (1996) provide a presentation of the assumptions necessary for IV esti-
mates to have a causal interpretation. In addition to those mentioned in the main text, in
the context of the current model the monotonicity assumption holds that those residing
27in a control district and report to be informed would not report to be uninformed if resid-
ing in a PCD, which seems intuitively reasonable. Furthermore, the stable unit treatment
value assumption holds that there is no interference between units which, in the present
context, means that treated citizens do not aﬀect the voting decision of others, an as-
sumption shared (if implicitly) by the randomized ﬁeld studies of Gerber and Green (2000)
and Gerber, Green and Shachar (2003). To the extent that informed PCD citizens exert
a positive informational externality on control district citizens inducing them to change
their behavior, the estimates reported in this paper provide a lower bound of the true
eﬀect. See Miguel and Kremer (2003) for an analysis of treatment eﬀects in the context of
externalities.
21Berlingske Tidende (1995); PLS Consult (2001).
22In addition to the results of the TSLS test of overidentiﬁcation, some comfort can
also be derived from the observation made by Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996, p. 451)
that the stronger the instrument, “the less sensitive the IV estimand is to violations of the
exclusion assumption.” As noted earlier (note 19), the PCD dummy is a strong instrument
for informed.
23Propensity score matching is carried out by running a probit regression of PCDon all
control variables from table three and a dummy variable for voting in the referendum on
the common currency as well as all pairwise interactions. The predicted values are used
as propensity scores in nearest-neighbor matching. The estimation is carried out using
the psmatch2 procedure in STATA 7.0. (Sianesi and Leuven, 2003). The distribution of
propensity scores is shown in ﬁgure A.1 in the appendix.
24Propensity score matching makes no diﬀerence to the results; results on the full sample
(not reported) are almost identical to those reported here, reﬂecting the fact that the
samples are very well balanced from the outset, as suggested by table 1.
25In this discussion, I implicitly assume that the main motive to go to the polling station
28would be to vote in the nationwide referendum. Could it be the case that the city district
referendum caused some people who would otherwise not have voted in the euro referendum
to go to the polling station? While possible, aggregate ﬁgures suggest that this is not the
case. The ratio of turnout in Copenhagen relative to the rest of the country in the Euro
referendum was .957, whereas the corresponding ratios in the previous general election
(March 1998) and the previous nationwide referendum (on the Amsterdam Treaty, May
1998) were .957 and .976, respectively, suggesting that turnout for the Euro referendum
in Copenhagen was not unusually high, which would have been the case if it was the city
district referendum that had been the primary reason to go to the polls for some people.
26A rough estimate of the total eﬀect of living in a pilot city district on the propensity
to vote can be calculated as follows: ATE of informed on voting × ATE of PCD treatment
on being informed = 0.213×0.106 = 0.023, where the former is the average over estimated
ATEs from table 4 and the latter is the estimated treatment eﬀect of living in a PCD on
being informed from the propensity score matching procedure. This number is very close to
the actual estimated diﬀerence in voter turnout between the pilot and control city districts
equal to 0.720−0.696 = 0.024 (calculated from Copenhagen Statistical Oﬃce, 2000). OLS
estimation on district level administrative data (n = 15) yields an estimate of 0.030 (s.e.
0.010).
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35A Descriptive Statistics and Coding
A.1 Survey questions and coding
1. Did you vote at the last municipal election? (1 = Yes, 2 = No, 3 = Do not remember, 4 =
Refuses to answer).
2. Did you vote in the referendum on the Economic and Monetary Union in September? and
if so, what did you vote? (1 = Voted yes, 2 = Voted no, 3 = Did not vote, 4 = Voted, but
will not say what for, 5 = Blank vote, 6 = Refuses to answer)
3. Did you vote in the referendum on city district reform in September? and if so, what did
you vote? (1 = Voted yes, 2 = Voted no, 3 = Did not vote, 4 = Voted, but will not say what
for, 5 = Blank vote, 6 = Refuses to answer). Coded: Category 6 excluded from sample.
4. In the municipality of Copenhagen an experiment on city districts have been carried out
in four districts. Would you say that this experiment went well, medium well or bad, or
do you not have an opinion? ( 1 = Good, 2 = medium good, 3 = bad, 4 = no opinion)
Coding: Opinion = 1,2,3
5. Do you ﬁnd that municipal council members are highely responsive, medium responsive,
not responsive to popular opinion, or do you not have an opinion? ( 1 = highly, 2 =
medium, 3 = not, 4 = no opinion) Coding: Ordinal, 1,2,4,3.
6. How interested would you say you generally are in political issues? ( 0 = little interest /
don’t know, 1 = medium interested, 2 = very interested).
7. Demographic questions: Gender, Age, Education (primary and lower secondary school,
high school, college, master’s degree, vocational training), yearly income (in thousands),
employment (private, public, not employed), user of decentralized services (old-age care,
child care, primary school, none).
36A.2 Descriptive statistics
Table A: Descriptive statistics
Initial sample Weighted sample
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. error
Turnout 2870 0.846 0.361 0.739 0.018
Informed 2870 0.646 0.478 0.526 0.018
PCD 2870 0.801 0.400 0.275 0.006
Municipal voting 2870 0.828 0.378 0.580 0.018
Euro voting 2870 0.924 0.266 0.874 0.013
Gender (F = 2, M = 1) 2870 1.552 0.497 1.555 0.017
Age 2870 41.801 18.453 39.873 0.571
College education 2870 0.489 0.500 0.480 0.018
Income 2026 272.862 197.523 283.253 8.109
Public employment 2870 0.287 0.452 0.293 0.015
Private employment 2870 0.365 0.481 0.400 0.017
User of elderly care 2870 0.121 0.326 0.106 0.011
User of day care 2870 0.194 0.395 0.176 0.013
User of primary schools 2870 0.163 0.370 0.175 0.014
Political interest 2870 1.089 0.677 1.027 0.026
Political responsiveness 2870 2.902 1.042 2.859 0.037
37A.3 Propensity score matching
Propensity score matching is carried out as described in the text. Figure A.1 shows the
distribution of the estimated propensity scores for the diﬀerent groups.



















38Table 1: Comparing Pilot City Districts and Control City Districts
Variable Obs. PCD mean CCD mean Diﬀ t-stat p-valuea
Income (1000 DKK) 2026 264.6 281.8 -17.2 -1.31 0.189
Turnout in municipal election (%) 2870 59.6 57.4 2.2 0.72 0.471
Turnout in Euro referendum (%) 2870 89.2 86.0 3.3 1.46 0.144
College education (%) 2870 48.3 47.9 0.4 0.14 0.886
Age 2870 39.6 39.4 0.2 0.23 0.817
Gender (% female) 2870 55.2 54.9 0.3 0.09 0.925
Publicly employed 2870 27.1 27.4 -0.3 -0.14 0.887
Privately employed 2870 38.5 41.9 -3.4 -1.21 0.225
Service1 (elderly care) 2870 11.5 10.2 1.3 0.75 0.452
Service2 (daycare) 2870 18.5 17.3 1.3 0.62 0.535
Service3 (primary school) 2870 14.9 18.5 -3.6 -1.73 0.084
Political responsiveness 2870 2.88 2.85 0.03 0.57 0.565
Political interest 2870 1.03 1.03 0.00 0.12 0.906
Administrative data
Turnout in municipal election (%) 59.6 57.4 2.2
Yearly income (1000 DKK) 179.0 176.0 3.0
College education (%)b 28.5 25.0 3.5
% of population >60 y 19.1 20.5 -1.3
Unemployment 7.4 6.1 1.3
Note: Sample weighed such that population size = 412425 in all tests.
aTwo-tailed test. bNot comparable to survey data due to classiﬁcation diﬀerences.
39Table 2: Estimating turnout
Variable Estimate s.e. t-statistic p-valuea
Informed, PCD (percent) 61.9 1.3
Informed, non-PCD (percent) 49.1 2.5
Diﬀerence 12.8 2.8 4.56 <0.001
Turnout, informed (percent) 78.4 2.4
Turnout, uninformed(percent) 69.0 2.9
Diﬀerence 9.5 3.7 2.56 0.011
Sample size = 2870. Population size = 412425. a Two-tailed test.
Standard errors are survey-corrected.
40Table 3: The eﬀect of information on voter turnout
Dependent variable: Voter turnout











































































































































Observations 2026 2026 2026
Wald χ2 245.67 196.04 246.45




Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. All models included a constant term, not
reported. Instrument: PCD dummy. ‡ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 % level. † Statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5 % level. ∗ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 % level.
41Table 4: Share of informed respondents by district and service user status






















n = 2026 n = 402 n = 1624
N = 412425 N = 299148 N = 113277
Survey-corrected standard errors in parentheses. ‡ denotes signiﬁcance at the 1 % level.
Note that numbers may not add up due to rounding.
42Table 5: IV-estimation of the eﬀect of information on voter turnout
OLS 2SLS IV-Probit Bivariate probit























































All models included the full set of covariates shown in table 3, including a constant term. Robust standard errors are
reported in parantheses.
Income sample: Excluding respondents with missing income information
Matched full sample: Excluding control group members outside common support; see text for details (income not
included as control variable).
‡ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 % level.
† Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 % level.
∗ Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 % level.
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